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Man: Anthrax, anthrax, botulinum toxin, plague, plague....
Tara O'Toole: Bioterrorism constitutes one of  the top international security  threats of  the 21st century.
George W. Bush: We must assume that our enemies would use these diseases as weapons.
Jonathon Tucker: The most likely  suspects are insiders, so ironically, the threat may  be us.
Tom Morton: Welcome to our nightmare.
George W. Bush: And we must act bef ore the dangers are upon us.
NewsReader: Good morning. In news just in there are unconf irmed reports that a number of  patients hav e been admitted to
hospitals in Germany  suf f ering f rom smallpox. Health authorities are ref using to comment until f urther tests hav e been done.
Man: The number of  conf irmed cases of  smallpox in Europe has risen to ov er 3,000 since this morning, European time.
Tara O'Toole: Smallpox has been eradicated in nature, and already  there's speculation that the outbreak could be the work of  a
terrorist group.
Tom Morton: Welcome to our nightmare.
Terrorists hav e released the smallpox v irus in major airports and train stations in Europe and the United States. The deadly  v irus
is spreading like wildf ire. World leaders must act. With only  limited stocks of  v accine, gov ernments must make urgent
decisions. Hundreds of  thousands of  liv es are hanging in the balance.
Welcome to Background Briefing on ABC Radio National. I'm Tom Morton.
Well, the scenario we'v e just described is, of  course, f iction. But it's one which was play ed out in Washington earlier this y ear.
The US is spending $6 billion on biodef ence: research on liv e, v irulent organisms like anthrax and plague. Many  American
politicians, f rom President George Bush down, believ e that the United States and its allies are v ulnerable to an attack by
terrorists with biological weapons.
The US is spending $6 billion on biodef ence: research on liv e, v irulent organisms like anthrax and plague. But many  top
scientists are say ing that bioterrorism is a beat-up.
Jonathan King: All of  this bioshield, bioterror, biodef ence is an enormous f raud on the public. This cannot be done in the
backy ard, it cannot be done in the basement, it cannot be done in the garage, and the notion that this could be done without
being detected, there's no basis in reality  whatsoev er.
Tom Morton: There's a f iery  debate raging, one in which the boundaries between science and politics, and f act and f iction
quickly  get blurred.
In January  this y ear, a group of  senior European and American politicians gathered in Washington to take part in Atlantic Storm .
Atlantic Storm was a dramatic exercise, one designed to alert the public and key  policy  makers, to the threat of  bioterrorism.
Tara O'Toole: Well I think the threat is v ery  real, in f act I would argue that bioterrorism constitutes one of  the top international
security  threats of  the 21st century. Biological weapons are at this stage of  our technologies, quite easy  to build and to
disseminate. There aren't a lot of  impenetrable technical barriers to a terrorist group unleashing a biological weapon, and such an
attack could cause great suf f ering and loss of  lif e as well as economic and social disruptions. So I f ear that the attraction of
bioweapons to terrorist groups will only  increase.
Tom Morton: That's Dr Tara O'Toole. She's the CEO of  the Center f or Biosecurity  at the Univ ersity  of  Pittsburgh, which
designed and ran Atlantic Storm .
Participants in Atlantic Storm included f ormer Secretary  of  State, Madeleine Albright and f ormer gov ernment ministers f rom
Canada, Poland, France, the Netherlands and Italy.
As the exercise began, they  were all meeting in Washington f or a Transatlantic summit.
Tara O'Toole: We alleged that as these leaders were f ly ing across the Atlantic f or this meeting, there were reports of  smallpox
cases in Europe coming on to the airwav es, and by  morning it was conf irmed that there were smallpox cases in Turkey  and in
Germany, and of  course since smallpox has been eradicated f rom the natural world, these conf irmed reports meant that there
had been smallpox attacks in Europe.
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NewsReader: European leaders of  the Transatlantic Security  Summit in Washington appealed f or calm. They  ref used to
speculate on the source of  the inf ection. Howev er, German Radio is reporting that a group called al Jahid al Jadid, believ ed to be
af f iliated with al Qa'eda is claiming responsibility  on an Arabic language website.
Tom Morton: The politicians watched news broadcasts f rom the f ictional Global News Network, describing an epidemic out of
control. A f ictional terrorist group called Al Jihad Al Jadid, has released smallpox in locations like Frankf urt airport, the metro in
Rotterdam and Penn Station in New York. More than 70,000 people were inf ected with the potentially  deadly  v irus.
Tara O'Toole: We posited that we had a number of  people walking through these busy  airports and train stations and so f orth,
with a backpack on them, just releasing what would be an inv isible, odourless cloud of  smallpox into the air.
Tom Morton: And the rationale behind hav ing the terrorists in the scenario, spread the v irus in the airports, was that there's a
v ery  large number of  people passing through these airports going to dif f erent destinations, in this case around Europe, and also
the United States. So y ou'd in a sense be achiev ing the maximum ef f ect by  spreading it there.
Tara O'Toole: Yes. There's an incubation period, the time between when one is exposed to smallpox or any  illness, any  v irus or
bacteria really, and when y ou start getting sick, when y ou become sy mptomatic. In that period which is about two weeks f or
smallpox, of  course people in our v ery  busy  and mobile society  can go all ov er the globe, and they  would. So that people who
were at Frankf urt Airport on one day  could be in v irtually  any  country  of  the world two weeks later when they  came down with
smallpox. And that would make it v ery  dif f icult to f igure out, at least at f irst, where the points of  attack were, and who might be
at risk and how big the scope of  the attack was and whether there was one or many  etc. etc.
Tom Morton: So once the exercise was under way, what were some of  the dilemmas which the public of f icials and politicians in
the exercise had to deal with?
Tara O'Toole: They  were struggling f or some way  to, f or example, harmonise rules about who could cross borders in Europe,
which of  course hav e been wide open, if  y ou're a member of  the EU, y ou can go f rom one country  to the other, but in the story,
f or example, we had people f rom Poland who had no v accine f looding into Germany, seeking v accine. Germany  does hav e quite
a good supply. Some countries wanted to close the borders in order to protect their people and also to prev ent their people f rom
spreading the disease f urther. But it was quickly  realised by  a member of  the European Parliament, Erica Mann, who was
play ing, that that would cause economic hav oc and dev astation v ery, v ery  quickly. So the idea behind it was to create a v iv id
experience with these leaders, in the hope that this kind of  portray al of  what might happen in a biological attack would be an
emotional experience f or them, that they  would then conv ey  to their colleagues, and spread the word that this was an important
problem that deserv ed more attention.
Tom Morton: Atlantic Storm was widely  reported in the American media. There were editorials in The Washington Post, calling f or
urgent action to combat the bioterrorist threat.
The creators of  Atlantic Storm knew which buttons to press. They 'd already  got the ear of  Vice-President Cheney  with a prev ious
exercise called 'Dark Winter'.
But prominent scientists hav e sharply  criticised both Atlantic Storm and 'Dark Winter'. But scientists say  it's highly  unlikely  that
terrorists could mount a mass attack with biological weapons, as the scenarios depict.
One of  those scientists is Jonathan King, Prof essor of  Molecular Biology  at MIT. King say s that the creators of  these scenarios
are panic-mongering.
Jonathan King: I would say  these scenarios were v ery  deeply  kind of  irresponsible, almost dangerous. They  present proposals
out of  the imagination as if  they 're actually  established, that some actual named al Qa'eda representativ es were in the Sov iet
Union getting smallpox stocks. Ev ery  piece of  which is a total f igment of  the imagination. The notion that the terrorists could
grow up smallpox in hidden f acilities, tissue culture f acilities which hav e extensiv e maintenance requirements, this is not again a
small-scale thing, it requires a lot of  skill, a lot of  money, a lot of  people, material being deliv ered in all the time, sterile
conditions, positiv e air control, this is not a low tech garage operation. These scenarios were loaded with proposals that
represented a kind of  misrepresentation of  what's known about these things, I would say  in an extremely  irresponsible way.
George W. Bush: [Applause] I ask y ou tonight to add to our f uture security  with a major research and production ef f ort to guard
our people against bioterrorism, called Project Bioshield. The budget I'v e sent y ou will propose almost $6 billion to quickly  make
av ailable ef f ectiv e v accines and treatments against agents like anthrax botulin and toxin, ebola and plague.
We must assume that our enemies would use these diseases as weapons and we must act bef ore the dangers are upon us.
[Applause]
Tom Morton: President George Bush announcing the creation of  Project Bioshield in his State of  the Union address in 2003.
Project Bioshield is a $6 billion program to strengthen America's biodef ence.
It sounds like a good idea. Who could argue, f or example, with doing research to create new v accines against diseases like
anthrax or ebola?
Well, lots of  people. Earlier this y ear 753 scientists wrote an open letter to the journal Science, questioning the direction of
research under Project Bioshield.
One of  those scientists was Richard Ebright.
Richard Ebright: It's been counterproductiv e with respect to biodef ence because at the same time it has been accompanied
by, indeed it has driv en a twenty f old increase in the number of  institutions with liv e, f ully -v irulent bioweapons agents, and a
twenty f old increase in the number of  indiv iduals with access, hands-on access to liv e, f ully -v irulent bioweapons agents.
Currently  in the United States there are more than 11,000 indiv iduals who'v e been registered f or access to bioweapons agents,
hands-on access to bioweapons agents. Now it f ollows mathematically  that there is an increased risk of  deliberate release. I
would argue the most likely  path, f or a sub-national adv ersary  such as al-Qa'eda, to acquire a bioweapons capability  is to obtain
the bioweapons agents and training and handling of  those agents by  penetrating one of  the bioweapons agents research projects
in the United States. One well-placed graduate student, post-doctoral f ellow or technician. No cost, salaries being prov ided
courtesy  of  the United States taxpay er, no risk, no dif f iculty.
Tom Morton: So are y ou say ing here that ef f ectiv ely, in y our v iew, the more people that are working on this kind of  research,
biodef ence research, the greater the risk that...
Richard Ebright: There can be no serious question. When Mohamed Atta and his associates wanted to learn how to f ly
aeroplanes into buildings, they  came to the United States and enrolled in f light schools, and receiv ed that training. If  a f uture
Mohamed Atta and his associates wishes to carry  the bioweapons attack, he will come to the United States, enrol in one of  the
univ ersity  programs in biodef ence sponsored by  National Institutes of  Health, obtain access to those agents, obtain training in
handling them, and mount an attack. This has been negativ e f or biodef ence, negativ e f or science, negativ e f or public health.
Tom Morton: Richard Ebright. He's Prof essor of  Chemistry  at Rutgers Univ ersity  and Laboratory  Director at the Waksman
Institute of  Microbiology.
It's been shown that the anthrax used in the 2001 postal attacks in the United States was weapons-grade anthrax f rom a US
military  source.
Jonathan Tucker is a f ormer UN biological weapons inspector, and senior researcher at the Center f or Non-prolif eration Studies
in Washington.
Jonathan Tucker: The great irony  of  the US biodef ence program, is it was stimulated in a massiv e way  by  the anthrax letter
attacks of  the Fall of  2001, and we still don't know who the perpetrator is. The great irony  of  the US biodef ence program is it was
stimulated by  the anthrax letter attacks of  the Fall of  2001, and we still don't know who the perpetrator is. The most likely
suspects are insiders, people who worked in the biodef ence community  and had access to dangerous pathogens and had all the
know-how and the equipment needed to weaponise them. So ironically  the threat may  be us. I mean at least to a large extent, we
may  be making the danger worse, rather than better, by  engaging in this ty pe of  research and dev elopment.
Tom Morton: The threat may  be us.
Those f iv e words of  Jonathan Tucker's encapsulate what many  of  the critics of  Project Bioshield are say ing, that the real danger
is not a mass bioterrorist attack by  a group like al-Qa'eda, but what's going on inside America's biodef ence laboratories. And
some of  it is pretty  kooky.
Edward Hammond: Probably  the strangest one that we'v e come across was a proposal that was f loated by  the Air Force in the
mid-'90s to dev elop a substance that would make enemy  soldiers gay, and the idea was that (this is not my  attitude about this,
but this was the attitude of  the proponents of  this weapon) was that it would cause a breakdown in morale among enemy  troops
if  they  could suddenly  be turned homosexual.
Reader: Proposed by  Wright Laboratory : Chemicals that af f ect human behav iour so that discipline and morale in enemy  units is
adv ersely  af f ected. One distastef ul, but completely  non-lethal example would be strong aphrodisiacs, especially  if  the chemical
also caused homosexual behav iour.
Tom Morton: Are these serious proposals?
Edward Hammond: I think the proposal to use a gay  aphrodisiac, it was certainly  made in all seriousness. I don't believ e that
there was any  activ ity  to actually  dev elop that weapon, if  it could ev en be dev eloped. I rather suspect that such a thing simply
doesn't exist. But at the same time that f or example that proposal f or the so-called aphrodisiac bomb was being f loated, the
army, the US army, was activ ely  researching dif f erent ty pes of  opiods, or opiates  in other words, drugs related to f entany l,
or to the illicit drug, heroin  f or use as a weapon. So real world research has gone f orward in recent y ears, and we know only
the outlines of  it because chunks of  it are classif ied, but where this is going to take us in the long run is our main concern.
Tom Morton: Edward Hammond, f rom the Sunshine Project. The Sunshine Project is a small, not-f or-prof it think-tank which
specialises in using FOI legislation to unearth classif ied military  research, like the aphrodisiac bomb.
Some of  that research borders on f arce. Did y ou know, f or example, that a small biotech company  in Texas has patented the
smell of  human shit, f or use as a non-lethal biological weapon?
As we'll hear a little later, the US Def ence Department is also looking at weaponising powerf ul anaesthetics like Ketamine and
ev en club drugs like Ecstasy.
But if  y ou think that's weird, there's something much weirder and potentially  much more dangerous happening as we speak, in
laboratories around the United States.
Research is already  under way  to genetically  modif y  diseases such as anthrax, plague and tularemia, research which is
specif ically  designed to make them ev en more deadly. Richard Ebright.
Richard Ebright: The kind of  research that is ongoing now inv olv es taking bioweapons agents and generating deriv ativ es that
are resistant to existing counter-measures, resistant to antibiotics, resistant to v accines. Taking bioweapons agents and
increasing their pathogenicity, increasing their v irulence; taking bioweapons agents and increasing their env ironmental durability,
so that they  can remain persistent in an env ironment f ollowing a distribution like that; taking bioweapons agents and increasing
their ability  to be disseminated or distributed widely  in an attack. This research as a result is exceedingly  dangerous, this
represents research that degrades national security, research f or which we spend money  to make ourselv es less secure. The
research on next-generation bioweapons agents we are engaging in an arms race with ourselv es.
The notion that engineered biological weapons, v iruses, manipulated to be more dangerous, is a decade of f , is simply  wrong.
Tom Morton: The rationale f or doing this kind of  research goes like this: terrorists might be able to genetically  modif y  diseases
like anthrax to make them resistant to antibiotics or v accines. Theref ore we need to be one step ahead of  the terrorists. We
need to make those antibiotic resistant strains of  anthrax ourselv es so that we can then dev elop new countermeasures.
Tara O'Toole: The notion that engineered biological weapons, v iruses, manipulated f or example to be more dangerous, is a
decade of f , is simply  wrong. It's a belief  that's held by  a lot of  people and policy -making circles at least in the United States,
largely  I think as a result of  their ignorance of  what's really  going on in biology. And as happens with any  technology, as time
passes the technology  gets easier and easier to use. The same thing is happening with these biological techniques, that were
once v ery  arcane and could be used only  by  sophisticated scientists in high lev el labs, are now routine procedures that are
perf ormed in hundreds if  not thousands of  labs all ov er the world ev ery  day, f or legitimate purposes.
Tom Morton: But is there really  a danger that terrorists could engineer their own bioweapons, as Tara O'Toole suggests?
Jonathan King: No. The notion that y ou can grow ebola v irus or Marburg v irus or smallpox v irus in y our garage or in y our
basement is a total absurdity.
Tom Morton: Jonathan King, Prof essor of  Molecular Biology  at MIT.
Jonathan King: Don't f orget that if  y ou want to grow these v iruses and become a terrorist, y ou hav e to liv e through the
experience, theref ore y ou hav e to not die f rom the inf ection y ourself . This can not be done in the backy ard, it cannot be done in
the basement, and all of  this bioshield, bioterror, biodef ence is an enormous f raud on the public. It takes an enormous amount of
equipment, if  y ou hav e to grow up cells and tissue culture, y ou hav e to hav e sterile conditions, y ou hav e to hav e high pressure,
y ou hav e to hav e the agents and materials which are v ery  expensiv e, constantly  brought in to keep the cells growing. You hav e
to be able to purif y  the v iruses, requires ultra centrif uges, high pressure f iltration equipment. This can not be done in the
backy ard, it cannot be done in the basement, it cannot be done in the garage, and the notion that this could be done without
being detected, there's no basis in reality  whatsoev er, and all of  this bioshield, bioterror, biodef ence is an enormous f raud on the
public. These agents are not presently  in existence, they 're not a threat to human population, that programs are going to bring
them into existence.
Man: Anthrax, anthrax, botulin toxins, ebola, and plague.
Reader: It was about this time that our townsf olk began to show signs of  uneasiness, f or f rom April 18th onwards, quantities or
dead or dy ing rats were f ound in f actories and warehouses. In some cases the animals were killed to put an end to their agony.
From the outer suburbs to the centre of  the town, in all the by way s where the doctor's duties took him, in ev ery  thoroughf are,
rats were piled up in garbage bins, or ly ing in long lines in the gutters.
Richard Danzig: The idea of  biological terrorism is ages old. In the Middle Ages people catapaulted cadav ers ov er the walls of
cities under siege, so that they  could spread plague. The British inf ected blankets with smallpox.
Tom Morton: Richard Danzig was Secretary  of  the Nav y  in the Clinton administration. And he's been a key  play er in the
corridors of  Washington in drawing attention to bioterrorism.
Richard Danzig: I think as Nav y  Secretary  I began  particularly  as the Under-Secretary  f or the Nav y, the number two job
 to think about areas that we had inv ested in heav ily  f or military  def ence, and areas that were potential v ulnerabilities to us,
where we had not inv ested heav ily. And the biological warf are, or biological terrorism issues were v ery  striking to me because
when I began to become interested in them a decade ago in the mid-'90s, it was pretty  ev ident that most of  the military  regarded
this as a set of  issues that really  weren't central to national security  concerns. Their v iew I think would be that these were issues
f or doctors, and doctors were support personnel. Weapons were things that exploded or had kinetic impact, and it was dif f icult I
think f or people trained in a prof ession that was so f ocused on a certain kind of  weapon, to see the potential in this other kind of
weapon.
Tom Morton: Well y ou say  in the paper that y ou wrote, entitled, 'Catastrophic Bioterrorism', that there are, as y ou put it, 'real,
possibly  imminent, and v ery  substantial dangers'. What specif ically  did y ou hav e in mind when y ou said that?
Richard Danzig: Well I think that there are sev eral dif f erent kinds of  modes of  biological attack. I think the one that is most on
our minds in general that's been v ery  much discussed in a lot of  the open literature is anthrax as a potential weapon. The Fall of
2001 mailing of  anthrax to v arious media and political f igures in the United States f urther heightened attention to anthrax as a
potential weapon. For me, that is the No.1 concern.
Reporter: It seemed to surprise no-one, anthrax arriv ing on the doorstep of  the US Congress.
George W. Bush: There has been today, I just talked to leader Daschle, his of f ice receiv ed a letter, and it had anthrax in it. The
letter was f ield-tested and the staf f ers that had been exposed are being treated.
Tom Morton: The anthrax attacks in the United States, coming soon af ter September 11, galv anised public concerns about the
threat of  bioterrorism. But in f act, the largest and most successf ul bioterrorist attack in American history  had occurred more
than ten y ears prev iously, and it went unnoticed at the time. The target was salad bars.
Here's biological weapons expert, Milton Leitenberg.
Milton Leitenberg: The v ery  f irst ev ent was this Rajneesh group in Oregon in 1984, and that's also important because they
considered what agent to use, and they  had a v ery  weird purpose, they  wanted to take ov er a country  election, and so they
wanted to make ev ery one sick on election day. And so they  considered an agent that could hav e been a bit more serious, and
decided not to do that, and what they  did was salmonella, and put it on salad bars, and so ev ery body  got the same kind of
intestinal diarrhoea that v isitors get when they  go to Egy pt or Mexico or India or Singapore. But it made 750-odd people ill, and it
was not understood that that's what had happened, until a y ear af ter. It was not understood that it was an ov ert act.
News Reader: Japanese police are tonight inv estigating the worst case of  terrorism in Japan in more than 20 y ears. As millions
of  people made their way  to work by  train, a deadly  nerv e gas, dev eloped by  Nazi Germany, was released on the Toky o subway
sy stem, killing six people, perhaps more.
The attack was caref ully  co-ordinated and according to the gov ernment, inv olv ed more than one person in the planning.
Tom Morton: In 1995, the Aum Shinriky o cult launched an attack in the Toky o subway, using sarin gas. Twelv e people were
killed, and thousands were hospitalised.
The gas they  used, sarin, is a chemical agent, but it wasn't the cult's f irst choice. They 'd already  tried to dev elop a much more
deadly  biological weapon, anthrax.
Milton Leitenberg: They  had f our y ears, they  had masses of  money, they  spent $10-million or so on this program, they  could
ev en go buy  an electron microscope. They  had a f ew trained people, but they  couldn't get the agents they  wanted. They  wanted
to make anthrax and botulinum toxin. They  could only  get the v accine strain of  anthrax, which would nev er make any one sick,
ev en if  they  knew how to grow it and distribute it properly. So they  nev er got a pathogen. In other words, some agent that would
actually  make people sick.
Secondly, they  didn't know how to work with what they  had. So they  made mistakes, and they  produced in f act nothing. And the
same happened with the clostridium botulinum, which is the bacillus which produces botulinum toxin, f ood poisoning. They  did not
get what they  needed and they  did not know how to make what it should produce if  they  had gotten what they  needed.
Tom Morton: Milton Leitenberg. He say s that Aum Shinriky o's f ailure to produce anthrax, despite the v ery  substantial money
and know-how they  had at their disposal, is a salutary  lesson. It ought to make us sceptical about claims that terrorist groups
could easily  acquire and use biological weapons.
In other words, those who talk up the threat of  bioterrorism need a reality  check.
Leitenberg say s we ought to be particularly  sceptical about f ictional scenarios like Atlantic Storm and Dark Winter, which simulate
a mass bioterrorist attack, killing tens of  thousands of  people.
Reader: The number of  conf irmed cases of  smallpox in Europe has risen to ov er 3,000 since this morning, European time.
Reporter: Smallpox has been eradicated in nature, and already  there's speculation that the outbreak could be the work of  a
terrorist group.
Tara O'Toole: We had done a dif f erent kind of  exercise called Dark Winter in June of  2001 in which we portray ed three smallpox
attacks on American cities, and had the f ormer of f icials pretend to be the US National Security  Council try ing to cope with these
attacks. And that was a v ery  successf ul exercise in that some of  the participants, notably  f ormer Senator Sam Nunn, were
v ery  galv anised by  the experienced, and started to persuade the US Congress that we needed to pay  more attention to the need
f or smallpox v accine.
Tom Morton: Now as y ou heard, the Dark Winter exercise was in June, 2001, a couple of  months bef ore September 11th. That
f ictional scenario assumed that Saddam Hussein might send terrorists inf ected with smallpox to the United States as biological
suicide bombers.
But in the af termath of  the attacks on the World Trade Center, that f ictional exercise acquired a sudden political potency.
Jeanne Guillemin is Senior Fellow at the MIT Security  Studies Program, and she say s that Dark Winter helped set the scene f or
claims that Saddam Hussein might giv e biological weapons to terrorists.
Jeanne Guillemin: So it was a v ery  politically  planned scenario, and I'm not sure ev ery one is aware, but in October of  2001,
af ter the 9/11 attack and f rankly  we were right in the middle of  just beginning to f eel the impact of  the anthrax letters, a staf f
person handed Vice-President Richard Cheney  a v ideotape of  the Dark Winter exercise with all these, to be f rank, exaggerations
about contagion rates and v iolence and people shooting each other in order to get v accinated, quite a horrendous scenario, I
think f rom any  point of  v iew, and one which was roundly  criticised in major medical journals by  the way, f or inaccuracies
concerning things like contagion rates. And in any  case, in October of  2001, Vice President Richard Cheney  saw the Dark Winter
v ideotape and on the v ery  same day  he went to a National Security  Council meeting and told the President that getting a
national smallpox v accination campaign would be a priority  f or the United States, so that's what we should do. And he was v ery
taken with the idea that Saddam Hussein in the scenario, had biological weapons, was going to attack the United States with
terrorists who were inf ected with smallpox and that the world was headed f or ev en more of  an apocaly ptic attack than they  had
just undergone.
Tom Morton: In Nov ember 2002, in the lead-up to the Iraq war, President Bush authorised a national smallpox v accination
campaign, beginning with the def ence f orces and f irst responders.
But the campaign was something of  a f izzer.
Jeanne Guillemin: It certainly  was. There were the deaths of  three f irst responders f ollowing their v accination, older people who
were at risk f or heart problems, and indeed the v accination had in the past been associated with heart problems, inf lammation in
the area of  the heart, and this is indeed what happened and three people died. And when that happened, which was in the early
part of  the program as it reached the civ ilian population, the program seriously  f altered. States that were interested withdrew,
hospitals that were going to co-operate withdrew, and I think the American public also got the idea as the inv asion happened,
there were no weapons of  mass destruction to be f ound in Iraq, there were no biological weapons in Iraq, it was this absolutely
tremendous publicity  about Saddam Hussein's biological weapons. But I think people in the United States began to say, Well y ou
know, what's more risky, that v accination or the risk of  Saddam Hussein's terrorists coming to this country  a la Dark Winter, and
inv ading it, inf ecting us with their disease? Well, they  said, y ou know, the v accine was a lot more risky  than in f act an inv asion
by  Saddam Hussein's terrorists. And people walked, they  walked away  f rom that v accination. And they  were right to walk away
f rom it.
Reader: The Pref ect greeted them amiably  enough, but one could see his nerv es were on edge. 'Let's make a start, gentlemen',
he said. 'Need I rev iew the situation?'
Richard thought that wasn't necessary. He and his colleagues were well acquainted with the f acts.
'The question', Old Castel cut in almost rudely, 'is to know whether it's plague or not.'
Two or three of  the doctors presented protested, the others seemed to hesitate. The Pref ect gav e a start and hurriedly  glanced
towards the door to make sure it had prev ented this outrageous remark f rom being ov erheard in the passage.
Old Castel, who was placidly  chewing his draggled y ellow moustache, raised his pale, bright ey es and gazed at Rieux. Then,
af ter sweeping the other members of  the committee with a f riendly  glance, he said that he knew quite well that it was plague, and
needless to say, he also knew that when it's to be of f icially  admitted, the authorities would be compelled to take v ery  drastic
steps.
Tom Morton: That's an excerpt f rom Albert Camus' nov el, The Plague, which deals with an outbreak of  bubonic plague in the
French colony  of  Oran. In the story  the authorities are reluctant to admit the plague has taken hold amongst the populace, and
reluctant to admit that they  can't control it.
Camus' nov el is both a grim portray al of  the actual ef f ects of  the plague and an allegory  of  France under the Nazi occupation, a
portrait of  a society  corroded by  f ear.
And the f ear that biological weapons generate, is a greater danger than the consequences of  their actual use. That's the
conclusion of  a report by  the Roy al Society  to the British gov ernment. Herbert Huppert was the Chair of  that working group.
Hubert Huppert: What I really  mean is that the chance of  their being used is relativ ely  small, and in all likelihood if  there is a
biological or chemical attack, the number of  people who'll be killed will again be relativ ely  small, and relativ e means in
comparison with our usual ev ery day  experiences. If  there is a biological or chemical attack, the number of  people who'll be killed
will be relativ ely  small, and relativ e means in comparison with our usual ev ery day  experiences. And I think it's interesting to
compare this with road accidents. In the United States on September 11th, 3,000 totally  innocent people were killed. That's
terrible, there's no doubt about that, but I think y ou hav e to compare this with the f act that 45,000 also innocent people are killed
each y ear on the roads, just in the US alone. So the terrorist attack of  9/11 was only  about a month-and-a-half 's-worth of  road
accidents.
So in our opinion, while the gov ernment should take v ery  seriously  this question of  potential terrorist attacks, I don't think the
man in the street need worry  about it v ery  f irmly. But it's the f ear that the people are taking on that is the greatest problem. So
what I would say  is the people should be knowledgeable about what might happen, but I don't think they  should go around f earing
what might happen.
Tom Morton: Hubert Huppert, Prof essor of  Theoretical Geophy sics at Cambridge.
Now if  Huppert is right, that we should be knowledgeable but not af raid, then how should we f eel about scenarios like Dark Winter
and Atlantic Storm , which dramatise the f ear of  bioterrorism?
Tara O'Toole: What we need to realise is that we liv e in a time when bioterrorism is a real possibility, and indeed we liv e in a time
when we are particularly  v ulnerable to world-wide epidemics. We're seeing it now in Asia with the av ian inf luenza worries
escalating. One of  the things that became clear in Atlantic Storm is that no country  is an island.
The initial instinct of  leaders when they  saw other countries under attack was to be generous with v accine. But as soon as their
own country  was threatened, they  became v ery  protectiv e, this is completely  understandable, of  their own people, and a lot
stingier with what they  were willing to giv e out. Yet if  smallpox was abroad in the world, we would all be at risk, and that's really
the case of  many  contagious diseases, y ou know, we can't continue to think of  nations as islands that can close themselv es
of f  f rom the rest of  the world when there's an inf ectious disease inv olv ed, we need global strategies and global operational
plans, not just national plans.
Milton Leitenberg: Well if  Dr O'Toole and her group had just play ed out the international response part of  the exercise without
hav ing written this scenario, I would say  the answer to the question is Yes. The f act that she didn't do that howev er, to me,
undercuts her whole claim f or what the v alue is, because I believ e the larger part of  the v alue to that group, just as it was in the
prev ious Dark Winter, are to be able to claim that this is possible to occur and be done by  bioterrorists. If  she had not made that
claim, then I would say  Yes, there's v alue in the exercise f or people to practice these kinds of  international response, and then
she could hav e done that all she wants. There was no need to cook up all of  this nonsense about what the terrorist group could
do.
Tom Morton: So this is panic-mongering, y ou're say ing?
Milton Leitenberg: Yes, absolutely.
Tom Morton: But I mean isn't there a v alue in us thinking about what our response ought to be in the ev ent of  a bio terrorist
attack?
Milton Leitenberg: Yes, but I think it should be key ed to what we really  think bioterrorists could be capable of .
Tom Morton: Milton Leitenberg, Senior Researcher at the Center f or International and Security  Studies at the Univ ersity  of
Mary land.
Reader: The Adv antages and Limitations of  Calmativ es f or Use as a Non-Lethal Technique.
The use of  pharmacological agents to produce a calm behav ioural state, particularly  of  indiv iduals and/or groups that are
agitated, aggressiv e and/or v iolent, is a topic with high relev ance to achiev ing the mission of  the military  and law enf orcement
communities.
Pharmacological agents can ef f ectiv ely  act on central nerv ous sy stem tissues and produce a less anxious, less aggressiv e and
ultimately  an easier-to-manage indiv idual.
Tom Morton: Recently, the Sunshine Project has uncov ered ev idence that the US military  is dev eloping a new generation of
chemical weapons.
Edward Hammond: The most worry ing aspect or ty pes of  non-lethal weapons would be drugs or biochemicals that would be
used in a way  that was similar to what the Russians used in the Moscow theatre in late 2002. So nearly  20% of  the people that
were in the theatre were killed by  this allegedly  non-lethal gas. In the published literature, if  y ou're shot with an AK-47 y ou hav e
about a 25% chance of  dy ing, so in other words, this allegedly  non-lethal gas alone was almost as deadly  as an automatic
weapon, f irst of  all. Second of  all, the Russian f orces did something which has happened historically, and that is they  perf ormed
summary  executions of  people who were unconscious and were unable to resist. And that of  course is illegal in and of  itself
under international law. But it mirrors the way  that so-called non-lethal agents hav e been used in the past. The United States
used tons and tons and tons of  teargas in Vietnam, but the teargas was used as a multiplier of  lethal f orce, not to sav e
any one's lif e, it was used to smoke people out of  cav es or out of  buildings so that they  could be shot. And this is the pattern if
y ou look at it historically  of  how these ty pes of  chemicals are used by  militaries. That class of  weapons really  has the potential
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to undermine both the Biological Weapons Conv ention, and the Chemical Weapons Conv ention.
Tom Morton: Secretary  of  Def ence, Donald Rumsf eld, has said that he believ es the Chemical Weapons Conv ention is 'a
straitjacket'.
In 2001, the Bush Administration ref used to ratif y  the v erif ication protocol of  the Biological Weapons Conv ention, which would
hav e allowed inspections of  US top-secret bio-research laboratories.
And already  research is under way  in f acilities operated by  the Department of  Homeland Security  and Department of  Def ence
to engineer bioweapons, to make them more v irulent, and more resistant to antibiotics. And there's more to come. Jonathan
Tucker.
Jonathan Tucker: One of  the centres is called the Biological Threat Characterisation Center, and we'll be looking not only  at
existing but also prospectiv e threat agents, including genetically  engineered strains, and it's planned that quite a bit of  this
research will be classif ied on the grounds that if  the adv ersary  knows about one's counter-measure, he could f ind way s of
circumv enting it. I think this is a v ery  dangerous logic and could lead willy -nilly  to a new of f ensiv e arms race in the biological
area. We hav e to almost bend ov er backwards, to be transparent, to reassure other countries of  our intentions. We may  be
comf ortable with our intentions that the United States has no desire to go back an of f ensiv e biological warf are program, but
other countries may  not be as conf ident or as trusting, and we hav e to persuade them that our intentions are in f act strictly
def ensiv e. And the best way  to do that is through as much transparency  as possible.
Tom Morton: Now if  y ou're f eeling depressed and helpless by  now, take heart. There are practical and prudent measures which
gov ernments can take to guard against bioterrorism, measures which don't inv olv e manuf acturing a whole new generation of
deadly  diseases.
Hubert Huppert: There's no doubt that science has a v ery  large role to play  and in f act one of  the recommendations of  the
report of  the Roy al Society  that I chaired and wrote a lot of  it, was that we could bring in new science and in particular new
scientists who'd worked on areas of  great importance to terrorism without realising it. And one of  the examples that I like citing is
that af ter our report came out, I receiv ed a phone call f rom a colleague of  mine who's the head of  the Mars Lander Program, and
he more or less said to me, Look, he's spent the last ten y ears thinking about Mars and he's v aguely  read about terrorism, but
when he saw the Roy al Society  had put out the report, he immediately  realised there'd be a lot of  work that he's put into try ing to
detect biological components on Mars, that the same sort of  scientif ic instrumentation and ideas could be used to make rather
rapid ev aluation of  the biological content af ter some attack.
Tom Morton: Hubert Huppert, Prof essor of  Theoretical Geophy sics at Cambridge.
You'v e been listening to Background Briefing. Our Co-ordinating Producer is Linda McGinnis; our Researcher and Webmaster is
Jason Di Rosso; Technical Production today  was by  Stev en Tilley ; and the original music y ou'v e been hearing was composed by
Tom Fitzgerald and recorded by  Andrei Shabunov. Our Executiv e Producer is Kirsten Garrett.
